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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT JOSEPH L. KROFCHECK 
In accordance with Rule 75 (p) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, wherein new matter raised in respondent's brief may be 
answered, Appellant replies with argument as follows: 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF SUSTAINS APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF AN INSUFFICIENT 
AFFIDAVIT TO PUBLISH SUMMONS, BY ADMITTING TO CERTAIN FALSITY THEREIN. 
The footnote on page 5 of Appellant's brief refers to circum-
stances that have been frustrating to Appellant thus far, in that 
certain representations contained in Respondent's affidavit (R 29, 
paragraphs 6 & 8) although discovered to be false at the last moment 
in the court below such issues have not been officially before this 
Honorable Court until now. 
That is, the affidavit (R 28, 29) upon which an order to publish 
the summons (R 27) was based, states: 
"Affiant has also been advised by said William Richards, 
(that Richards) had numerous contacts with Robert 
W. Major and Joseph L. Krofcheck, that neither of such 
persons resides in the State of Utah, and that Joseph L. 
Krofcheck was believed to be then residing at 16363 Royal 
Hills Drive, Encino, California 91316 " (Brackets 
added) 
Paragraph 6., Respondent's Affidavit (R 28, 29) 
As hereinbefore indicated, attorney William Richards has denied 
the foregoing statements attributed to him by Respondent's Affidavit 
(R 28, 29) in a sworn affidavit of his own (Appellant's brief, foot-
note, page 5). 
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However, the Respondent has now also implicitly admitted the 
falsity of the aforesaid quoted recitals appearing in the said Affi-
davit (R 28, 29), by virtue of these statements from their brief on 
appeal herein: 
"Mr. Melling was told by Richards' staff that his office 
had had numerous occasions to contact Major and Krofcheck 
by mail and the most recent addresses contained in the 
Richards' files for both men were noted. Melling attempted 
to have legal process served upon Krofcheck at the address 
given him by Richards' staff (16363 Royal Hills Drive, 
Encino, California)..." (T-mphasis added) 
Brief of Respondent, Statement of Facts, page 9, second 
paragraph. 
Thus, the facts which are admitted to in Respondent's brief 
(page 9, supra) are not those sworn to by Mr. George D. Melling in his 
affidavit (R 28, 29); and, since extensive conversations and corre-
spondence as well as a formal hearing in this Honorable Supreme Court 
specifically embraced the aforesaid conflicting statements prior to 
the filing of Respondent's brief, it is reasonable to assume that 
yery careful consideration was given to the language which Mr. Melling 
employed in his said current Brief of Respondent (page 9, supra.) 
Therefore, on the face of the record and pleadings now properly 
before this court on appeal we are able to verify that Mr. Melling's 
affidavit (R 28, 29) is indeed a false affidavit. Moreover, had said 
affidavit set forth the true nature of Mr. Melling's "diligent search", 
as admitted to in his subject brief, it is unlikely that Judge Harding, 
or any Judge, would have issued an order for the publication of summons 
as was rendered in this matter (R 27). Specifically, what person on 
"Richards' staff" "told" Mr. Melling about the "contact" with Appellant, 
and "noted" information from the "Richards' file", and provided "the 
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address" for Appellant (3-1/2 year old incorrect address), as finally 
admitted to herein (Respondent's brief, page 9, supra)? We know that 
attorney William Richards did not represent those matters, as originally 
sworn to by Mr. Melling in his affidavit (R 29, par. 6 & 8). However, 
even if said affidavit had conformed to the facts now admitted to in 
Respondent's brief (page 9, supra), and the "staff" member was disclosed 
by name (which has not been done even yet) it is doubtful that such a law 
firm secretary, receptionist, filing clerk, legal messenger or possibly 
janitor (constituting the "staff"), could be considered a single 
competent source for ascertaining Appellant's whereabouts, particularly 
since attorney Richards and his law firm have never been Appellant's 
legal counsel! 
The legal authority cited by Respondent in defense of the purported 
"sufficiency of the Melling affidavit" (Respondent's brief, page 18, (2)) 
instead will support Appellant's position under the foregoing 
circumstances: 
"In Liebhart (Liebhart v Lawrence (Utah) 120 p. 215) this 
court held that the affidavit was willfully false and that 
the resulting publication of summons was invalid. And in 
Bowen, (Bowen v. Olson, (Utah) 246 P.2d 602) this court 
held that the affidavit which had been prepared on a printed 
form was apparently fraudulent and that the service of the 
summons by publication was invalid." 
Brief of Respondent, pages 18, 19. 
Appellant's brief herein, pages 13 to 17, encompasses his position 
regarding the insufficiency of the Melling affidavit (R 29,) on grounds 
other than the falsity charge described above in this reply brief. 
However, the grounds in both briefs, whether taken together or con-
sidered independently, compel the conclusion that the said affidavit 
(R 29) is certainly insufficient to warrant an order for publication 
of summons (R 27). 
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POINT II 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF FURTHER SUPPORTS THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE 
MELLING AFFIDAVIT BY ADMITTING TO SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF ANOTHER 
SOURCE FOR APPELLANT'S ADDRESS, WHICH WAS NOT USED. 
Respondent erroneously represents to this court that Utah Code 
Annotated Sect. 57-3-2 (1953) merely states that Respondent would only 
be charged with notice of prior documents recorded affecting "that 
same real property" (Respondent's brief, pp. 21,22) covered by their 
mortgages. Reference to said statute reveals no such limitation. 
Moreover, Replacement Volume 6A, Utah Code Annotated, embraces the 
"general and permanent laws of the state in force at the close of 
the fortieth legislature ... 1973" (UCA, Vol. 6A, title page). Thus, 
this Utah case would govern the interpretation of said Sect. 57-3-2 
through 1973, having been cited thereunder in said Replacement Volume 
6A, to wit: 
"One who deals with real property is charged with notice 
of what is shown by the records of the county recorder 
°f the county in which the real property is situated." 
TEmphasis addedj 
Crompton v. Jenson, 78 U. 55, 1 P.2d 242 
Were Respondent's view of the aforesaid statute accurate the past 
and current practice of federal and state tax authorities, judgment 
creditors and general lienholders in recording their notices against 
named individuals without describing specific property, would be 
unavailing. Such is not the case, however, and county recorder's 
records are indexed for speedily cross checking names and realty cover-
ing extended periods of time, for all documents filed in the respective 
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Utah counties. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, and the fact there were multiple 
records readily available disclosing Appellant's current address 
(Appellant's brief, pages 4, 5, and 16), Respondent has attached a 
Warranty Deed copy, identified as "Appendix G", to their brief herein. 
They admit this instrument does in fact affect "that same real property" 
embraced by their mortgages, (Respondents brief, page 22) and that they 
knew of this vesting prior to the Melling affidavit (Respondent's 
brief, page 9). In the upper left hand corner of said deed appears 
the name: "M. ALAN BUNNAGE, Suite 220, 9220 Sunset Blvd., Los Angeles, 
California, 90069", which party was legal counsel for Appellant. Re-
spondent has never claimed said attorney for Appellant was ever con-
tacted in any way and the George Melling affidavit (R. 28, 29) nowhere 
indicates this probable source for Appellant's address was even con-
sidered in Respondent's "diligent search" for Appellant's whereabouts. 
Since Appellant was the grantee under said deed,( Respondent's 
"Appendix G"), physical possession of that instrument would customarily 
be directed into the custody and/or control of said Appellant-Grantee; 
and, a fortiori, the party named to receive by mail said deed "when 
recorded" (Respondent's "Appendix G.", upper-left) would be a logical 
source leading to Appellant and would at least put a reasonable person 
on notice to make inquiry of said "M. Alan Bunnage" (Respondent's 
"Appendix G.", upper left), particularly when that same deed contained 
the designation "trustee" for Appellant indicating others were involved 
in said conveyance. 
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Therefore, we have this evidence of Respondent's actual knowledge 
of at least one other likely source for Appellant's correct address 
who could have been easily contacted yet Respondent was satisfied to 
rest their "diligent search" on a single inquiry of "Richards' staff" 
(Respondent's brief page 9), and thereafter have their summons and 
complaint mailed by the Clerk to an address they knew beforehand was 
erroneous (R. 29, par. 8; R 30; R 42). 
POINT III 
RESPONDENT'S LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORT APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT 
RESPONDENT'S PUBLISHED SUMMONS WAS INSUFFICIENT. 
Respondent's brief, pages 26 to 30, engages in argument attempt-
ing to show that this statement, from Respondent's published summons, 
complied with Rule 4 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
"This is an action to foreclose two mortgages on real 
property located in Summit County, Utah." (R 45) 
Summit County Bee Newspaper, Dec. 20, 27, 1973; Jan. 
3, 10, 1974. 
The first in line of legal authorities cited by Respondent seeking 
to validate the sufficiency of the foregoing "description" of the real 
property involved herein should be perfunctorily dismissed, since even 
the portion of the decision quoted from Flanery v. Kuska, 173 NW 652, 
a 1919 Minnesota case, states: "The statute does not prescribe the 
form of a summons" (Respondent's brief, page 27), indicating the 
Minnesota statute did not conform to the requirements of Utah's Rule 
4 (c). 
Respondent's rely on "the test set out in Flanery", (Respondent's 
brief, supra.), dealing in very general terms with the question of 
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the notice intended to be given by a summons generally. However, 
"Flanery" is not the test for published summons as shown by: 
"It is an established principle that in order to give a 
court jurisdiction through publication the statutory 
procedure must be followed, and the courts are disposed 
to require strict compliance with the statutes." 
(Emphasis added) 
62 Am. Jur. 2d 896, Sect. Ill 
As to the legal meaning of the term "strict" we refer to: 
"A narrow construction of a statute...plain, obvious or 
natural import of the language used." 
50 Am. Jur. Statutes, Sect. 388 
Next in the line of Respondent's authorities are two Washington 
State cases, Decorvet v. Dolan (1893) 35 P. 72, and Chase v. Carney 
(1939) 90 P. 2d 286, which also must be routinely dismissed since ad-
mittedly the publication of summons statute governing said cases "does 
not specifically require any such description" (Respondent's brief, 
page 28), again indicating inapplicability to the instant cause before 
this court which is governed by a Utah statute that does require a 
"description of the subject matter or res involved in the action" 
(Rule 4 (c), supra.) 
Respondent's next authority must be examined more closely inas-
much as Respondent has failed to encompass the primary essentials of 
this case, Caldwell v. Bigger, 76 Kan. 49, 90 P. 1095 (Respondent's 
brief, page 28) which if they had would have destroyed their entire 
argument that opposes Appellant's position on the subject. Thus, 
Appellant can summarize the facts in this case to clearly show that 
a detailed legal description for real property is contemplated under 
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a Kansas publication of summons statute, as set forth in said case's 
decision: 
"(1) Process-Service by Publication - Description of 
Property. 
In an action to quiet title, a notice by publication, 
which describes the real estate by the lot & block 
numbers of an addition to a city according to the 
recorded plat thereof, which plat designates the land 
by its proper government subdivision, which has in fact 
been of record for a number of years, which has been 
recognized by the city and public generally, and which 
has been acted upon by the authorities for purposes of 
taxation, sufficiently identifies the property affected 
to give the court jurisdiction as against a defendant..." 
(Emphasis added) 
Caldwell v. Bigger, 90 P. 1095, (Supra.) 
"The certificate to the plat specifically stated that it 
embraced the NE 1/4 of Section 12, T23 S, R 6 W, of 6th 
Principal Meridian...Service was made by publication... 
and the notice was regular in e\/ery respect except that 
the land was described as lots in blocks of the Hutchinson 
Inv. Company's 9th Addition to the City of Hutchinson ac-
cording to the recorded plat thereof." 
Caldwell v. Bigger, at page 1096 (Supra.) 
By contrast, Respondent's statement in their published summons 
was limited to: "real property located in Summit County, Utah" 
(Respondent's brief, "Appendix E"), which certainly fails the con-
clusion and test contained in Respondent's own cited authority 
(Respondent's brief, page 28), to wit: 
"The statutory requirement is satisfied if, from the 
notice published, any person of common understanding 
would be able to locate and identify the property." 
Caldwell v. Bigger, (Supra) 
The final case cited by Respondent's brief, page 29 thereof, 
presumably as relevant authority on the sufficiency of their "descrip-
tion" of the real property involved under said Rule 4 (c), U.R.C.P., 
is identified as Francis v. Allen, 79 N.E. 2c[ 803 (Ohio 1947). 
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There are vital distinctions between Respondent's Francis case 
and Appellant's cause herein. Foremost among these is the basic Ohio 
statute concerning the requirements for publication of summons as dis-
closed by the decision: 
"Section 11295 of the General Code provides that the 
notice (for publication of summons) ... must contain 
a summary statement of the object and prayer of the 
petition, mention the court wherein it is filed, and 
notify the person or persons thus to be served when 
they are required to answer." 
Francis v. Allen, (Supra.) 
Thus, said statute does not require a description of the res in-
volved as does Rule 4 (c) U.R.C.P. 
Ohio statutory procedure proceeds to further separate itself from 
Utah by requiring that claimants to real property, whether by mortgage 
foreclosure or otherwise, first sequester such property by attachment, 
etc., before serving a non-resident defendant with summons by publica-
tion, as indicated from Respondent's aforesaid Francis authority: 
"Where personal service cannot be had on a non-resident 
defendant and action seeks to establish a claim or de-
mand against such defendant, before court can acquire 
jurisdiction (over defendant's property), a seizure of 
property of such non-resident defendant is required as 
a basis for constructive service. Gen. Code 11292, 
subdv. 7, and Sect. 11819, subdv. 2" (Emphasis added) 
Francis v. Allen (Supra) 
However, where a plaintiff, such as Respondent, wishes to obtain 
jurisdiction in rem over the real property of a non-resident defendant, 
such as Appellant, through the publication of summons without first 
sequestering the same pursuant to the foregoing Ohio statute, the said 
Francis case cites the following authority for doing so, but on the 
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basis of a detailed description for the land as proposed by Appellant 
which is contrary to Respondent's view thereof, to wit: 
"Where a petition asks to have specific land approp-
riated. . .and the publication notice contains a^  par-
ticular description of the land sought to be ap-
propriated. ..this constitutes a sequestration of the 
property and gives the court jurisdiction to dispose 
thereof upon final decree." 
Reed v. Reed, 167 NE 684 (Ohio; cited in Francis v. 
Allen, supra) 
The most charitable view of Respondent's analysis of said Francis 
v. Allen (supra) case would be that such evaluation as contained in 
their brief at page 29 is out of context, is incomplete and actually 
supports Appellant's claim that a more detailed description of realty 
is necessary. 
Therefore, there being no further legal basis cited by Respondent 
in opposition to the authority shown by Appellant's brief, (pages 10 
and 11), Appellant is satisfied that the foregoing analysis of Re-
spondent's own cases on the subject will support Appellant in this 
respect. 
POINT IV 
RESPONDENT ALLOWED THE SHERIFF'S SALE TO BE CONDUCTED KNOWING 
BEFOREHAND THAT PRIOR PROCEEDINGS, INCLUDING THE PUBLICATION OF 
SUMMONS, USED THE WRONG CASE NUMBER. 
Respondent's brief, page 10, second paragraph thereof, admits: 
"At some time during March, 1974, Downey (Respondent) discovered that 
the ...Clerk had initially assigned the number 4473 to this case and 
to a case entitled 'Utah State Employees...etc.' but that upon dis-
covering the error the Clerk had (without informing Downey) added the 
-10-
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letter 'A' to the designation of this case (R 1; R 72, p. 5a and 7). 
On April 9, 1974, Deputy Sheriff Leon Wilde conducted a sale of the 
five parcels of land." 
Appellant's brief, page 12, first paragraph thereof, refers to 
a specific instance (R 72; par. 7) where an inquiry was misdirected 
due to the error admitted to by Respondent herein. Despite this, 
Appellant argues that such an error is implicitly prejudicial when the 
same is repeated over and over again on multiple documents in the court 
below including most of the pleadings, the Melling affidavit (Respond-
ent's Appendix "A"), the Summons (Respondent's Appendix "B"), the 
California Affidavit of Service (Respondent's Appendix "B", second 
sheet), the publication of summons and proof thereof (Respondents 
Appendix "E") and the Proof of Publication of the Sheriff's sale itself 
(Respondent's Appendix "F"), to mention a few. 
Appellant's said argument, of implicit prejudice, is particularly 
appropriate in the instant circumstances due to what can be considered 
a further lack of diligence on the part of Respondent by virtue of 
their prior knowledge of such error "during March, 1974" before the 
Sheriff's sale on April 9, 1974 (Respondent's brief, page 10). 
It seems reasonable that Respondent in an abundance of caution 
should have at least re-published the defective summons and Notice of 
Sheriff's Sale of Real Property (Respondent's Appendix "F", reverse 
side), with the correct numerical designation before permitting the 
judicial sale of the subject property where Appellant, appearing as 
the last vestee of record in the capacity of "trustee", had on the 
face of the record never appeared or otherwise been contacted by 
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Respondent. Moreover, Respondent admits that the nature of Appellant's 
trust and the other beneficiaries involved "are as yet unknown to 
Respondent" (Respondent's brief, page 9, first paragraph). Such ad-
mission supports Appellant's argument since "substantial justice" 
(Respondent's brief, page 30) certainly fails to serve Appellant where 
the aforesaid matters are known to Respondent before said judicial sale, 
yet no real diligence is demonstrated in disseminating notice and seek-
ing out the real parties in interest under the subject foreclosure. 
POINT V. 
RESPONDENT'S INSUFFICIENT, FALSE MELLING AFFIDAVIT AND DEFECTIVE 
PUBLICATION OF SUMMONS RELIEVES APPELLANT FROM PRESENTING A "MERITORIOUS 
DEFENSE" TO OR RECOGNIZING THE VOID JUDGMENT RESULTING THEREFROM. 
Respondent's brief raises two further issues attempting to support 
their position, namely: 1) that Appellant did not interpose any 
meritorious defense to the original foreclosure, in Appellant's motion 
to set aside said proceeding (Respondent's brief, pages 12 to 14); and, 
2) that Appellant made no attempt to redeem the foreclosed real property, 
after judgment, from the judicial sale buyers (Respondent's brief, 
pages 6 and 31). 
Germane to the foregoing, Appellant's brief makes these points: 
a) The extended redemption period was for the purpose of per-
mitting Appellant time to obtain and reconcile mortgage payment 
records and other matters outside his possession and control, which 
he still has been unable to accomplish (Appellant's brief, pages 2, 3, 
7, 18 and 19); 
-12-
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b) Appellantwasa non-assuming successor to the original obligors 
under the subject mortgages, other parties were obligated to make the 
mortgage payments for releases of land,and they retained all records 
thereof (which parties were and are now uncooperative and adverse to 
Appellant), Respondent and Appellant were not in communication with 
each other, Respondent deviated substantially from the terms of the 
notes and mortgages involved (moratoriums, changed payment schedules, 
altered land release schedules) and Appellant was the ultimate (and 
therefore most important) legal title vestee of record. (Appellant's 
brief, pages 2, 3, 7, 18 and 19); 
c) Appellant still has not been furnished with all the Respondent's 
relevant records, communications, agreements and other proper evidence 
concerning the matters referred to in the preceding paragraphs; nor 
have the parties who were in direct contact with and making payments 
to Respondent ever furnished a single document to Appellant encom-
passing such matters, thus entitling Appellant to his legal right of 
discovery and trial of the issues. (Appellant's brief, pages 2, 3, 7, 
8, 18 and 19). 
Beyond the argument embraced by the foregoing, the fact remains 
that the judgment rendered by the court below is void not voidable, 
(see POINTS I, II, III, and IV hereof) This being the case, Appellant 
did not have to present a meritorious defense, or submit to the courts 
jurisdiction by redeeming the property based on said void decree, as a 
condition to setting aside said decree in the said lower court, as 
indicated by the following Utah case: 
-13-
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"(2)...Defects In Service. In a suit to set aside a 
decree of divorce (quasi in rem action; 24 Am. Jur. 2d 
Div. & Sep. Sect. 245) it is not necessary for the 
plaintiff to allege that she had a meritorious defense... 
or to offer to submit to the jurisdiction of the court 
in that action, where the court had never had juris-
diction of her person (Involves defective service 
of summons by publication on non-resident based on 
misrepresentation in affidavit)" 
(Emphasis and brackets added) 
Atkinson v. Atkinson, 43 Utah 53, 134 p. 595. 
"Under such circumstances (defective summons by pub-
lication) the respondent was entitled to have the 
judgment set aside as a matter of right and not as 
a matter of grace, (citing: 1 Black on Judgments 
J2d Ed.), Sect7T48)" 
(Emphasis and brackets added) 
Atkinson v. Atkinson (supra.) 
This court did acknowledge the existence of a doctrine which 
requires a moving party in an original action to show a meritorious 
defense. However, Utah departs from said principle under the fol-
lowing reasoning: 
"But is this the rule without exception, and must a 
party also do this in a case wherein the plaintiff 
has been guilty of fraud in inducing the court to as-
sume jurisdiction of the action in which the default 
judgment is entered, or where, as here, the court 
never acquired jurisdiction of the person, because 
the order for service by publication and the pretended 
summons were void? the (Utah) state courts can 
acquire no_ jurisdiction of the res or subject-matter 
so as to render judgment which would be binding." 
(Emphasis added) 
Atkinson v. Atkinson, (supra; at page 597, first column) 
Utah is supported in its adoption of the principle that a party 
need not present a meritorious defense, or otherwise submit to 
jurisdiction under a void judgment, according to these decisions: 
Holcomb v. Creech (Ken. 1933) 56 SW 2d 998 (Action to vacate default 
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judgment for want of proper service of process); John Hancock Mut. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Cooley (Washington) 83 p.2d[ 221 (Cross complaint 
to avoid default judgment for invalid service of process); Dixie 
Meadows etc. v. Kight (1935 Oregon) 45 p2d 909 (Suit to set aside 
judgment for defective service of process); and, here is a more re-
cent case quoted on issues close to Appellant's cause: 
"(1) Statute authorizing service of process by publication 
must be strictly complied with..."; 
n(4) Where affidavit for service by publication was de-
fective, the attempted service by publication was void 
and the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the 
defendant." (Emphasis added); 
"(5) Tender of meritorious defense is necessary in ord-
inary proceedings to vacate judgment, but where ground 
for vacation of judgment is that court rendering judg-
ment sought to be vacated was without jurisdiction of 
defendant by failure to comply with statutory require-
ments as to service of process (by publication) tender 
of meritorious defense is unnecessary." 
TTmphasis added! 
Beachler et. al. v. Ford (1945 Ohio) 60 NE 2d 330 
Even more recent decisions are available, following the foregoing 
doctrine, as shown by: 
"Meritorious defense is not essential or relevant on 
motion to set aside default judgment for lack of juris-
diction by reason of want of service of summons." 
Kleinfeldt v. Shoney's of Charlotte (1962 N.C.) 127 SE 2d^  573. 
"Defendant was not required to show meritorious defense 
where default judgment which defendant sought to have 
set aside was void." 
Stafford v. Dickison (1962 Hawaii) 374 P.2^ d 665. 
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WHEREFORE, Appellant requests this Honorable Supreme Court to 
consider the elements of this reply brief together with Appellant's 
opening brief in determining the merits of the subject appeal. 
DATED this £*** day of D f c i o L » ^ 1975. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DON R. STRONG 
Appellant's Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Served two copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant 
Joseph L. Krofcheck, upon each counsel for Respondent and the 
Intervenors named on the title cover hereof, by mailing the same 
to the addresses set forth on said cover, postage prepaid, this 
_ _ S day of P e A o L * / , 1975. 
/C £. 
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